Abstract-The increasingly important role of Long Term Evolution (LTE) has increased security concerns among the service provider and end users and made security of the network even more indispensable. In this paper, the power control mechanism for LTE is explored. The unprotected power control signal together with the Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier (CRNTI) can be exploited to trick the victim User Equipment (UE) to transmit at a much higher than required power, which introduces significant inter-cell interference to the adjacent based station, evolved NodeB (eNodeB). The ways that an attacker can maliciously manipulate the control field of the power control mechanism are demonstrated. The effectiveness of such attack is evaluated with respect to the victim UEs and the adjacent eNodeB.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid increase in data usage in mobile communication systems has led to the development of fourth generation (4G) wireless technologies, which includes long term evolution (LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WIMAX). LTE is a standard developed by the Third Generation Partnership Program (3GPP) Long Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution (LTE/SAE), a consortium of telecommunications associations formed in order to define communication standards, and is specified in the 3GPPs Release 8 document series, with minor enhancements described in Release 9.
The overall high level objective of LTE is to provide an extremely high performance radio-access technology that provides full vehicular speed mobility and that can coexist with HSPA and previous networks. With the scalable bandwidth functionality of LTE, the operators will be able to migrate their networks and users from HSPA to LTE over time with ease.
LTE is able to provide unprecedented performance in terms of peak data rates, delay, and spectrum efficiency to the network when compared with its predecessors. LTE can provide up to 100Mbps downlink data rate and up to 50 Mbps uplink data; this is four times faster than previous HSPA+ data rates.
Security is indispensable for secured communication between users and mobile networks. The increasingly important role of LTE has brought about a number of security concerns among the service provider and end users [1] - [8] .
In this paper, the focus is on exploring the power control mechanism for LTE. The objectives of power control are to improve the system capacity, coverage and user experience, while at the same time reduce the power consumption of the UE. Fundamentally, uplink power control for LTE is a combination of an open-loop mechanism, where the UE transmit power depends on estimates of the downlink path loss, and closed loop mechanism, where the network can directly control the UE transmit power by means of explicit transmitter power-control (TPC) commands transmitted in the downlink [9] . This closed loop mechanisms is computed dynamically and updated from sub-frame to sub-frame. An adversary can inject false power-control commands to control the UE transmit power. This paper illustrates that a false power-control can be injected and can reduce the UE battery lifetime. In real world implementation, the attacker will be sitting between the UE and eNodeB and silently reducing the effectiveness of the UE by limiting its battery lifetime.
The paper consists of five sections. Section II discusses the weakness of LTE networks. In Section III, the power exploitation is explained, and the performance results of the attack is discussed in Section IV. Lastly, conclusions are provided in Section V.
II. POWER CONTROL WEAKNESS IN LTE NETWORK
Uplink power control for LTE refers to a set of tools by which the transmit power for different uplink physical channels and signals are controlled to ensure that they are received at the cell site with an appropriate power. The objectives of power control are to improve the system capacity, coverage and user experience, while at the same time reduce the power consumption of the UE. In order to fulfill these objectives, power control mechanisms are used to maximize the desired received power signal and to minimize the amount of interference caused to the neighboring cells.
Fundamentally, the power control formula consists of 2 main portions. The first part is computed according to the parameters signaled by the eNodeB. The second part is computed dynamically and updated from sub-frame to sub-frame.
The overall closed loop power control for Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) transmission can be described according to [10] . This transmitting power P T is set at the UE using the parameters signaled by the eNodeB and is calculated as
where P max is the maximum allowed transmit power of the particular UE class; P 0 is a cell specific parameter that is broadcast as part of the system information, also seen as desired received power; α is the path loss compensation factor; P L DL is the downlink path loss estimated by the UE; M is the instantaneous bandwidth in terms of number of physical resource block (PRB); Δ mcs is the different SINR required for the different modulation schemes and coding rates; and δ is the explicit power control adjustment command.
Since P max is fixed and the second term of the min function in (1), i.e., P 0 +αP L DL +10log 10 (M )+Δ mcs +δ, is variable, the UE transmit power is limited by P max . In addition, the UE transmit power takes the lower value of the function in (1) .
To study the impact on the inter-cell interference to the eNodeB, some assumptions and simplifications on the parameters used in (1) are made. In particular, P max is fixed at 23 dBm [11] ; P 0 is assumed to be constant; α is assumed to be 1 with full compensation of path loss and is equal for all cells. In addition, the parameters P L DL , M and Δ mcs are assumed constant, and finally, δ is maliciously set to its maximum value.
To better appreciate the parameters involved in (1), they are illustrated in Figure 1 . The parameters P 0 and α are signals that are broadcast at periodic intervals of 160 ms. The parameter δ is the explicit power control command signal from the eNodeB to the UEs at periodic intervals of 1 ms and constitutes to the dynamic part of the power control equation. The typical use of the explicit power control command is to compensate uplink multipath fading, which is not reflected in the downlink path loss. The parameter P L DL is the path loss estimate calculated by the UE. This downlink path loss can be estimated by measuring the received power of the downlink cell-specific reference signals. The parameter P max is the maximum allowed transmit power of the UE.
A. Closed loop power control mechanism (Normal)
Uplink power control for LTE is a combination of an open-loop mechanism, where the UE transmit power depends on estimates of the downlink path loss, and closed loop mechanisms, where the network can directly control the UE transmit power by means of explicit power-control commands transmitted in the downlink.
The closed loop power control mechanism allows the UE to fine-tune the uplink transmit power based on the transmitted closed loop correction value known as the transmit power control (TPC) command. The TPC command is computed based on the desired closed loop signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) and the measured (estimated) received SINR at the UE. When the received SINR is below the desired SINR target, a TPC command is transmitted to the UE to request for an increase in the transmitter power. If not, a decrease in transmitter power is requested. The computation and the steps involved in the closed loop power control are illustrated in Figure 2 . In Figure 2 , the boxes shaded in blue are actions performed by the eNodeB, while those in brown are actions performed by the UE.
The objectives of the closed loop power control to provide the required SINR are to achieve an acceptable level of communication between the eNodeB and the UE and to reduce the amount of interference received by the neighboring cells. At the same time, power control aids in optimizing the limited battery power of the UE and achieves power efficiency.
B. Closed loop power control mechanism (Modified)
A malicious adversary can modify the TPC field to a large value during the feedback loop transmission from eNodeB to UE as shown in Figure 3 . In Figure 3 , the boxes shaded in red are actions performed by the malicious adversary. When the TPC command field is adjusted to 7, corresponding to a value of 8 dB, this can increase the transmit power to P max according to (1) and trick the UE into transmitting power at a higher power level. The respective TPC commands and values [10] are shown in Table I . In the case of PUSCH transmission, the explicit power control command controlling the term δ is included in the 20 bits uplink scheduling grants (UL grant). The content of the 20 bits uplink scheduling grants [10] is shown in Table II . The UL grant field is in the MAC Random Access Response (MAC RAR) [12] , which also consists of three other fields: R, Timing Advance Command and Temporary CRNTI. A MAC PDU [12] consists of a MAC header and zero or more MAC RAR.
III. ATTACK APPROACH
The attacker acts as a combination of eNodeB and the UE. Initially, the attacker impersonates a UE and connects to the genuine eNodeB to obtain the cell-specific reference signal. At a later stage the attacker presents itself as bogus eNodeB and generates false messages to the victim UE. The attacker can perform a message injection attack on the victim UE, and this is to be performed in three stages. Stage 1 involves the extraction of the messages between the victim UE and the eNodeB to obtain Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier (CRNTI). Stage 2 involves the calculation of the timing advance in order to synchronize the false message frame to the victim UE. Stage 3 involves the injection of false messages with the TPC sub-field adjusted to the designated value to change the behavior of the victim UE.
An adversary is able to determine the victim UEs search space using the pre-captured CRNTI and construct message to the particular UEs search space and, thereafter, inject the message according to the pre-determined timing. The injected false message arriving at the victim UE will be of higher power than the message transmitted from the legitimate eNodeB; thus, the legitimate message will be overwritten. Upon receiving the message, the victim UE decodes the content of the control channel region according to the search space and processes the information such as the scheduling assignment and the scheduling grants.
A typical set-up of a MITM attack is shown in Figure 4 . In this set-up, the position of the victim UE, the attacker and the eNodeB form an extended line. The distance between the eNodeB and the victim UE and the transmitted power of the eNodeB are denoted as d 1 and P T,1 , respectively. The distance between the malicious attacker and the victim UE and the transmitter power of the malicious attacker are denoted as d 2 and P T,2 , respectively. The received power at victim UE from eNodeB and attacker are denoted as P R,1 and P R,2 , respectively.
The received false-signal-to-legitimate-signal ratio SIR P r2 /SIR P r1 at the victim UE is derived in the following steps. The parameter SIR P r1 is calculated as
where I is the total co-channel interference received, and P R,1 is determined by
where G T,1 is the gain of the transmitter at eNodeB; G R is the gain of the receiver at the victim UE; and L is the propagation loss. Substituting (3) into (2), we get
The power law equation is determined as
where β is a proportionality constant that is a function of the antenna heights of both transmitter and receiver and the carrier frequency, and n is the path loss exponent factor. Substituting (5) into (4), we get
Similarly, for the attacker, the SIR P r2 is calculated as
86 (7) by (6), we get the received false-signal-to-legitimate-signal ratio as
The power required for the malicious attacker to inject the false message is dependent on the received SIR of the victim UE. This received SIR is in turn dependent on both transmitters power, the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, and the path loss exponent n as illustrated in (8) . The set-up is assumed to be in lossy environment where n is four. In order to effectively overwrite the legitimate message from the eNodeB, the power of the injected false message must be significantly higher than that of the former.
A graph for the required power of the injected message can be derived based the distance ratio d 2 /d 1 and the desired received false-signal-to-legitimate-signal ratio P R,2 /P R,1 at the victim UE as shown in Figure 5 . The relationship between the proximity of the attacker to the victim UE and the required attackers transmitted power is shown in Figure 5 .
An example is used to illustrate the required transmitted power of the attacker based on the various false-signal-tolegitimate-signal ratios. In this example, the victim UE is located 2 km from the eNodeB, while the attacker is 200 m from the UE. This yields a distance ratio of 0.1. The eNodeB is transmitting at 30 W. From Figure 5 , we see that the required transmitted power of the attacker is only 0.02 times the amount of the transmitted power of the eNodeB when the desired received SIR ratio at the victim UE is 3 dB. This equates to only 0.6 W of power required for the attackers transmitter. The required transmitted power of the attacker for the various remaining false-signal-to-legitimate-signal ratios is tabulated in Table III . In general, the closer the attacker is to the victim UE, the lower the power required to conduct the attack. 
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
The adversary s action has two results. First, it depletes the limited battery power of the UE at a faster rate and reduces the intended operation period. Second, it causes interference to the neighboring cells. A combination of this interference from the neighboring cells increases the interference perceived by the eNodeB and reduces the desired SIR of the eNodeB. The decoding capability at the eNodeB is determined by the SIR instead of the absolute received power. Thus, the increase of inferences of neighboring UEs to the eNodeB reduces the SIR and changes the modulation and coding scheme (MCS) to one, which lowers the maximum throughput. This in turn, restricts the legitimate UEs to accessing their desired network services at a much lower data rate.
A. Depletion of battery power
The battery lifespan of an end device is dependent on many parameters including the device operation system, use applications, and user profiles. These applications in turn determine the required bandwidth and the required transmit and receive power of the end device. An approximate approach is used to explore the depletion rate of the battery power of a device transmitting at 23 dBm, which is the maximum UE power specified in [11] . Typically, a bandwidth demanding application like streaming video will require higher transmit power for data transmission. As such, in this study, we assume the estimated battery life of a phone continuously streaming video or browsing the web to represent the battery life of the phone transmitting at 23 dBm. Also, we assume that the estimated battery life of the phone performing an idle push 87 Fig. 6 . Battery lifespan of four LTE phones by applications email function to represent the battery life of the transmitting at average power value. The estimated battery life of four types of LTE phones by applications [13] is plotted in Figure 6 . For purposes of comparison, we use the data of the Skyrocket phone to illustrate the UE depletion rate of battery power for the various applications. From Figure 6 , it is shown that Skyrocket will have 210 minutes of battery lifetime for streaming of video and will have 640 minutes of battery lifetime for idle-push email. Analogously, a phone transmitting a maximum power of 23 dBm has only 210 minutes of battery lifetime, which is a reduction of 430 minutes from a phone transmitting at nominal power. The phone battery lifetime is reduced to 33% of the original battery lifetime when transmitting at maximum power.
B. Reduction of Reverse Channel SIR
The inter-cell interference condition is illustrated in Figure  7 . The solid green line indicates the desired transmit signal from the legitimate UE (UE4) located at the corner of the outer cell of cell O to the eNodeB. Since the neighboring cell edge users adopt sectoring, only cells D, E and F in the first tier which are facing the intended sector (Channel 2) contribute to the co-channel interference (CCI). However, as none of these three cells are using Channel 2, the interference comes from the second tier. In the second tier, the only cells using Channel 2 and facing the intended sector are bottom cell A and two cells B. The locations of UEs are designated as UE1, UE2 and UE3, respectively, as shown in Figure 7 . The solid red lines indicate the interference generated to the eNodeB by UEs (UE1, UE2 and UE3) of adjacent cells.
The total co-channel interference I received by the eNodeB in cell O is given in [14] and restated as follows
where G T is the gain of transmitter at the neighboring UE; P T,A , P T,B and P T,B are the transmitted power from UE2, UE1, and UE3, respectively; and L A , L B and L B are the Fig. 7 . Reverse channel interference analysis for edge area propagation loss of transmitted power from UE2, UE1, and UE3, respectively. By rearranging (9), we get
The reverse channel SIR of the cell edge area (CE) for 120 o -sectoring [14] SIR CE,120 o is defined as
where P R,O is the received power from UE4 (legitimate user) and is calculated as
where L O is the propagation path loss between UE4 and eNodeB, and P T,O is the transmitted power of UE4. Substituting (10) and (11) into (12), we obtain
where L B , L A , L B and L O are the path losses for UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4, respectively. The L B value is calculated as
where β B is a proportionality constant that is a function of the antenna heights of UE1 and eNodeB, and R is the radius of the cell. The L A value is calculated as
where β A is a proportionality constant that is a function of the antenna heights of UE2 and eNodeB. The L B value is calculated as
where β B is a proportionality constant that is a function of the antenna heights of UE3 and eNodeB. The L O value is calculated as
where β O is a proportionality constant that is a function of the antenna heights of UE4 and eNodeB.
Substituting (14) to (17) into (13) and assuming that β O = β A = β B = β B for the coverage area, we get the reverse channel SIR of the CE as
From (18), we observe that the SIR is dependent on the power transmitted by the UEs and is independent of the cell radius. The average SIR can be computed to indicate the average SIR experienced by the eNodeB and is given by
where SIR i represents the SIR experienced by the eNodeB computed by the respective transmitted power combination of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4 as shown in Table IV . The parameter p i represents the probability of that SIR value occurring, computed within the specified transmitted power range, and M represents the number of transmitted power combinations of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4. The average SIR, namely SIR Ave,normal , experienced by the eNodeB is computed. The SIR Ave,normal is the average SIR experienced by the eNodeB based on the normal scenario where all the interfering power is random.
To formulate the value of the average SIR Ave,normal experienced by eNodeB, it is assumed that sampling is performed on the transmitted power of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4. The transmitted powers can assume one of the twenty values, which range from 10 mW to 200 mW with steps of 10 mW. The SIR Ave,normal is computed based on (18) and (19), with various input combinations for the different transmitted power of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4. There is a total of 20 4 =160,000 combinations of SIR with run-number 1 computed based on transmitted power of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4 being 10 mW and run number 160,000 based on transmitted power of UE1, UE2, UE3 and UE4 being 200 mW as shown in Table IV . A relatively lossy environment with n = 4 is assumed in the computation, and p i is 1/(number of combinations) where each combination of transmitted power is equally likely to occur.
The results of the SIR Ave,normal for the various combinations of the transmitted power are simulated using Matlab code and are shown in Figure 8 . The enlarged figure for the first 100 combinations is shown in Figure 9 .
Region 1 can be observed in Figure 8 , while region 2 is illustrated in Figure 9 , which shows the first 100 data points of Figure 8 . In region 1 of Figure 8 , formed by the first 8,000 combination runs, the SIR increases significantly to 10 dB at combination run-number 21 as compared to the previous run. This occurs when the transmitted power of UE3 is reset to 10 mW, while the transmitted power of UE2 is set to 20 mW. There is an overall decrease in the interfering power from combination run-number 20 to 21. The SIR generally follows a downward trend for this region until the transmitted power of UE4 is set to 20 mW. At combination run-number 8,001, the SIR increases significantly as the desired transmitted power of UE4 is set 20 mW as compared to the previous 10,000 combinations where the transmitted power of UE4 is at 10 mW. This pattern can be observed for the subsequent 15,000 combination runs. Overall, the SIR increases as the desired transmitted power of UE4 increases.
We observe that in region 2 of Figure 9 , formed by the first 20 combination runs, the SIR decreases as the interfering power of UE3 increases from 10 mW to 200 mW for corresponding runs while the transmitted power of UE1, UE2, and UE4 remain at 10 mW. The SIR is inversely proportional to the interfering power.
A Matlab simulation code is used to calculate the average SIR Ave,normal experienced by eNodeB according to (19) and the computed value is 11.7 dB.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the victim UE can be tricked by the false message generated by the bogus eNodeB to transmit at a much higher than required power, which introduced significant inter-cell interference to the adjacent eNodeB. The impacts of the attack include depleting Fig. 9 . Signal-to-interference ratio for first 100 combination of UEs transmitted power to compute SIR Ave,normal the limited battery power of the victim UE at a much faster rate and reducing the reserve channel SIR of the eNodeB. The intended phone battery lifetime is reduced to 33% of the original battery lifetime when transmitting at maximum power. The simulation results show that there is a reduction in reverse channel SIR due to interferences.
